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Consenting to Computer Use
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ABSTRACT
The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA ") makes it a crime
to "access[] a computer without authorization or exceed[] authorized access."
Courts and commentators have struggled to explain what types of conduct by
a computer user are "without authorization." But this approach is backwards;
authorization is not so much a question of what a computer user does, as it is
a question of what a computer owner allows.
In other words, authorization under the CFAA is an issue of consent, not
conduct; to understand authorization, we need to understand consent. Build-
ing on Peter Westen's taxonomy of consent, I argue that we should distinguish
between the factual question of what uses a computer owner manifests her
consent to and the legal question of what uses courts will deem her to have
consented to. Doing so allows us to distinguish the different kinds of ques-
tions presented by different kinds of CFAA cases, and to give clearer and
more precise answers to all of them. Some cases require careful fact-finding
about what reasonable computer users in the defendant's position would have
known about the owner's expressed intentions; other cases require frank pol-
icy judgments about which kinds of unwanted uses should be considered seri-
ous enough to trigger the CFAA.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") makes it
a crime to "access[] a computer without authorization or exceed[]
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. I presented earlier versions of this Article at
the "Hacking into the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: The CFAA at 30" Symposium and to a
faculty workshop at the University of Maryland. Thanks to the participants, and to Aislinn
Black, BJ Ard, Julie Cohen and the students in her Technology Law and Policy Colloquium,
David Gray, Orin Kerr, Christopher Newman, Jonathan Mayer, Paul Ohm, Rebecca Tushnet,
and Peter Winn. This Article may be freely reused under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
1 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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authorized access." 2 This simple phrase has proven surprisingly con-
troversial. Courts and commentators have sharply debated whether
violating terms of service, sharing passwords, guessing URLs, chang-
ing one's IP address, or using information for a disloyal purpose can
render access unauthorized. 3 These analyses have proceeded on the
assumption that "authorization" either bears a determinate meaning
or can be given one that will answer such questions.
This entire approach seems to me to be fundamentally misguided.
The term "without authorization" as used in the CFAA does not refer
to what a computer user does; it refers to what a computer owner says
about those uses. The CFAA does not of its own force define a class
of prohibited conduct, because literally any conduct in relation to a
computer could be either authorized or unauthorized. It all depends
on what the computer owner chooses to allow. Reformatting a com-
puter's hard drive may be an unauthorized act of wanton vandalism
when carried out by a prankster, but it is all in a day's authorized work
for a company's IT contractor. Questions of the form, "Does the
CFAA prohibit or allow X?" are posed at the wrong level of abstrac-
tion. The issue is not whether X is allowed, but whether X is allowed
by the computer's owner.
2 Id. § 1030(a)(2). The various prongs of the CFAA also include jurisdictional, circum-
stantial, mental state, and result elements. See id. § 1030(a). But for reasons not here relevant,
"authorization" has done most of the hard work of defining the CFAA's boundaries of criminal-
ity. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization"
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596, 1628-40 (2003).
3 The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 2164, 2216-18, 2228-30 (2004) (IP addresses and terms of service); Lee
Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 Prrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 24, 26
(2012) (passwords); Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 2, at 1622-24 (authorization); Orin S.
Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,1178-79 (2016) [hereinafter Kerr,
Norms of Computer Trespass] (password sharing); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1578-87 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr,
Vagueness Challenges] (internet terms of service and disloyal purposes); Jonathan Mayer, Cyber-
crime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1453 (2016) (workplace computer use and commercial dis-
putes); David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent
Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 921-23, 929-30 (2013) (terms of service and
passwords); Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 Bus.
LAw. 1395, 1432 (2007) (passwords); Mary W. S. Wong, Cyber-trespass and 'Unauthorized Ac-
cess' as Legal Mechanisms of Access Control: Lessons from the US Experience, 15 Irr'L J.L. &
INFo. TECH. 90 (2007); Cyrus Y. Chung, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Com-
puter Science Can Help with the Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 240, 250
(2010) (terms of service and passwords); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA
as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 755-61, 768-72 (2013) (terms of
service and workplace computer use).
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That is, authorization under the CFAA is a defense in the same
way that consent is a defense to torts and crimes including trespass,
battery, and rape. 4 To access a computer with "authorization" is to
access it with the properly given consent of its owner.5 To access a
computer "without authorization" is to access it when the owner has
not so consented. Everything turns on the "moral magic" of consent. 6
This Article analyzes "authorization" under the CFAA using the
conceptual building blocks of consent. The punch line is that "without
authorization" does not refer to a fixed category of conduct, because
legally sufficient consent has always been something that courts create
rather than find. Part I sets the stage by describing what is distinctive
about consent to use a computer, as opposed to consent to surgery,
consent to sexual relations, consent to entry on land, or consent to any
of the many things that people may do only with someone else's per-
mission. Computer use is technically and temporally intermediated,
so an owner cannot approve or reject proposed uses as they happen.
Instead, she will typically need to give prospective consent, leaving it
to users and courts to interpret the scope of that consent and to apply
it to conduct the owner may not have anticipated.
With that background, the rest of the Article follows Peter Wes-
ten's careful taxonomy of the various meanings of "consent," with em-
phasis on the particular features that are often salient in CFAA cases.7
4 See generally, e.g., 86 C.J.S. Torts § 38 (2016) ("A person who consents to another's
conduct cannot bring a tort claim for the harm that follows from that conduct; no wrong is done
to one who consents. The existence of consent means that the defendant did not commit a
tort."); 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 7 (2016) ("[I]f a victim consents to the touching, the
touching is not unlawful and is not battery."). There are some crimes, such as murder, to which
consent is not a defense. PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEP-
TIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 111-19 (2004). Unauthorized
computer use is not this sort of crime.
5 The owner might delegate this power to authorize to someone else, as when a cloud
service provider hosts websites for its customers. The service provider owns the computer, but
the website operators determine which website users are authorized. I will refer to "the owner"
for simplicity. A party might also be "authorized" by law; this is a form of authorization that
does not depend on consent. The CFAA itself states that it "does not prohibit any lawfully
authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency." 18
U.S.C. § 1030(f). Here, "authorized" refers to the authority of the United States, not of the
computer owner. Stewart Baker has argued that the owner of data stored on a computer is also
empowered by the CFAA to determine the scope of "authorization," an argument that has been
thoroughly and persuasively debunked by Orin Kerr. See generally Stewart Baker et al., The
Hackback Debate, STEPTOE CYBERBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/
11/02/the-hackback-debate/ [https://perma.ccl322T-NN4Z] (collecting blog posts on the issue).
6 Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996); Larry Alex-
ander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1996).
7 WESTEN, supra note 4, at 111. For more on consent in law, see generally DERYCK
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Westen's fundamental distinction is between factual consent and legal
consent. Factual consent (discussed in Part II) is a state of the world;
it exists when a person acquiesces in conduct by another that affects
her. But legal consent (discussed in Part III) is a conclusion of law: it
exists where the law decides to treat a person as acquiescing in an-
other's conduct. Legal consent is defined in terms of factual consent,
but factual consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for legal con-
sent. Different types of CFAA cases raise different types of issues
about the scope of consent, and we should take care to distinguish
them. Part IV discusses some of the confusion that results when fac-
tual and legal consent are conflated.
I. COMPUTERS
I would like to start by considering what, if anything, sets con-
sent-to-use-a-computer problems apart from other problems of con-
sent in criminal and tort law. The answer, a little tautologically, is that
consent to use a computer involves the use of computers. A user's
conduct takes place within a space that is regulated, in the first in-
stance, by software rather than by humans. Two characteristic fea-
tures of software therefore come into play.
The first is automation: once created and made available,
software can run on its own, without further human control.8 This
creates a distinctive sequencing in computer-use cases. Except in
some trivially easy cases-like a burglar who first breaks into a home
and then sits down at the homeowner's computer to check
Facebook-the user always uses a computer program knowingly and
voluntarily made available by the computer's owner.9 In typical rape
and robbery cases and a great many theft and trespass cases, the sub-
ject (and potential victim) is present and conscious. She can wait until
an actor proposes a course of action to decide whether to grant or
withhold consent and to take actions that thwart or enable his actions.
But in most computer-misuse cases, the owner is absent: she provides
the software and some indicia of consent and then waits for the user to
BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW (2007); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO SELF (1986); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT
TO SEXUAL RELATIONS (2003).
8 James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1723 (2005).
9 See Orin Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, supra note 3, at 1153-55 ("understanding
the concept of authorization to computers ends up being surprisingly hard"). In CFAA terms,
most interesting cases involve "exceeding authorized access" rather than "access without
authorization."
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act.10 Often, the software itself will react to the user so quickly that
there is no conceivable way that the owner can respond in time.1
Even if the user's course of conduct extends over a significant (to a
human) span of time, the owner may be monitoring the computer only
virtually, and so may not know what the user is doing until afterwards.
In all these cases, the owner's consent to computer use is necessarily
prospective rather than contemporaneous.
Prospective con-ent is not unique to computer-misuse cases.12
Patients who will be unconscious during surgery typically give pro-
spective consent to being cut open with knives, to the risk that some-
thing will go wrong with the cutting, and to being cut further if
something does.' 3 And people regularly give prospective consent to
what would otherwise be trespasses and conversions: "The key is
under the mat" and "I hereby authorize direct withdrawal of my $9.99
monthly donation" are both forms of prospective consent.1 4 Prospec-
tive consent to computer use has features characteristic of prospective
consent by absent owners to uses of property in trespass and theft
cases, and features characteristic of prospective consent by incapaci-
tated surgical patients in battery cases.
The law has typically approached such cases with an eminently
sensible pragmatism. Recognizing the subject's prospective consent
facilitates autonomy by extending the range of voluntary transactions
she can prospectively consent to. Zipcar, surgery, and roller coasters
would be impossible without prospective consent. But the limits the
subject specifies are also respected, to prevent others from taking ad-
vantage of her inability to respond. 5
A nineteenth-century case illustrates both concerns. In Mitchum
v. State,16 a storekeeper left a box of matches on a countertop "to be
used by the public in lighting their pipes and cigars in the room."' 7
Mitchum took the whole box.'8 He was convicted of larceny, and
rightly so. 19 The storekeeper's generosity would have been futile if
10 See James Grimmelmann, Computer Crime Law Goes to the Casino, CONCURRING
OPImoNs (May 2, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/05/computer-crime-law-
goes-to-the-casino.html.
11 See Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 8, at 1723, 1744.
12 WESTEN, supra note 4, at 248-54.
13 Id. at 249.
14 See id. at 251.
15 See id. at 253-54.
16 Mitchum v. State, 45 Ala. 29 (1871).
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everyone who took a single match was guilty of larceny. It would
have been equally fruitless if Mitchum was allowed to make off with
the whole box. Only recognizing both the prospective consent and its
limits makes it possible for storekeepers to leave unattended boxes of
matches for their customers.
So far, so good, but a second distinctive feature of software com-
plicates the story. "Software is plastic: Programmers can implement
almost any system they can imagine and describe precisely." 20 This
fact vastly increases the complexity of people's interactions with
software. In particular, it means there will almost always be cases in
which software behaves in a way its programmers neither expected
nor intended.21 Software is buggy, and automation plus bugginess
makes software hackable. 22
This is not entirely a new problem. A nineteenth-century English
case, Regina v. Hands,23 presents the issues in embryonic form. I can-
not improve on Lord Coleridge's statement of the case and holding:
In this case a person was indicted for committing a larceny
from what is known as an "automatic box," which was so
constructed that, if you put a penny into it and pushed a
knob in accordance with the directions on the box, a ciga-
rette was ejected on to a bracket and presented to the giver
of the penny. Under these circumstances there is no doubt
that the prisoners put in the box a piece of metal which was
of no value, but which produced the same effect as the plac-
ing a penny in the box produced. A cigarette was ejected
which the prisoners appropriated; and in a case of that class
it appears to me there clearly was larceny. The means by
which the cigarette was made to come out of the box were
fraudulent, and the cigarette so made to come out was
appropriated. 24
In modern terms, Hands and his codefendants hacked a cigarette
vending machine. The most sensible analysis is that there was never
consent to the taking. The owner of the machine made his consent
conditional on depositing a penny; no penny was deposited. The de-
20 Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 8, at 1723.
21 Id. at 1723, 1741-42.
22 Id. at 1742-43 (discussing hackability, in which "if Program X regulates some activity, a
hacker who succeeds in replacing Program X with Program X' of her own devising will have
gained the same absolute control over that activity that the original programmer once enjoyed");
see generally Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1327 (2008) (contrasting rhetoric and reality of hacking).
23 Regina v. Hands [1887] 16 LRCCR 188 (Eng.).
24 Id. at 190.
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fendants succeeded in taking a cigarette while leaving only a worthless
slug; that they did so by exploiting a mistake in the cigarette box's
logic rather than by punching a hole in the side is of no moment. 25
Modem computers differ from the vending machine in Hands only in
the degree of their plasticity: they are far easier to program with far
more complicated logic, which in turn makes it possible to find more
complex and more catastrophic bugs. 2 6
These observations suggest two general principles that should in-
form any theory of consent to use a computer-not just under the
CFAA but in any context where unauthorized use of a computer is
legally prohibited. 2 7 On the one hand, the law will need to respond to
a distinctive risk of opportunism on the part of ill-intentioned com-
puter users. They can observe in detail how the software works and
then arrange their interactions with it for maximum benefit-quite
possibly at the owner's expense. 28 Just as it is impractical for owners
to perfectly secure their computers, it is impractical for them to per-
fectly specify ex ante the scope of consent to use them. 2 9 Courts apply-
ing the CFAA must make allowance for the difficulties facing
computer owners. But on the other hand, computer owners who have
second thoughts about a use someone has made of their computers-
or who anticipate having second thoughts-will themselves be
tempted to behave opportunistically either by arguing after the fact
that they were deceived about some relevant fact or by setting out
ahead of time a disingenuously broad statement of what constitutes
unauthorized use. 3 0 This creates a risk of arbitrary enforcement, and
courts interpreting the CFAA must also make sure that users are
25 See id. at 190-91. Indeed, a purely mechanical case like Hands shows the folly of trying
to draw too sharp a line between software and hardware. The court's use of "fraudulent" also
deserves a raised eyebrow; query who was deceived by the fraud. But the holding is sound: as in
Mitchum, the result is necessary if vending machines are to be possible.
26 See Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 8, at 1742.
27 There are many examples of non-CFAA contexts where unauthorized use of a com-
puter is prohibited. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A)
(2012) (digital rights management); Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2012)
(communications privacy); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (trespass to chattels);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (breach of contract). The details of
legal consent under these various regimes will vary with their relevant policy concerns, but they
share a common core of consent.
28 Cf Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism 12-15
(Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabs
tractid=2617413 (arguing that opportunists can take advantage of the inherent limitations of
laws expressed as rules, and that standards-based equitable discretion responds to this risk).
29 See id. at 7-8.
30 See id. at 12-13.
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clearly informed about which conduct the law will treat as "unautho-
rized." This tension-between the need to give clear ex ante notice of
what is allowed and the need to respond ex post to unanticipated
abuse-is not unique to computer-misuse law. 3 1 But the technical
complexity of modern software makes both halves of the problem dis-
tinctively more difficult.
In short, interpreting consent to use a computer poses a problem
of prospective consent. Courts need to ensure that computer users
receive fair notice of the scope of allowable use, and that computer
owners are protected against unforeseen misuses. This is a more chal-
lenging task online than off, because software systems are subtler and
more complex than their offline analogs.
II. FACTUAL CONSENT
Now that we are clear on the nature of the problem, we can be
clear on the nature of the relevant consent. Philosophers disagree on
whether the fact of consent is subjective-a mental state of con-
senting-or objective-an expression of consenting.32 For legal pur-
poses, the answer is that it could be either: for example, some
jurisdictions define consent for purposes of rape law in terms of a vic-
tim's subjective mental state of consent while others define it in terms
of a victim's objective manifestations of consent.33 Westen calls the
first attitudinal consent and the latter expressive consent.34 A subject S
gives attitudinal (factual) consent to conduct x by an actor A when she
adopts an attitude of acquiescence toward x; 3 5 she gives expressive
(factual) consent when she represents that she has such an attitude.36
"Authorization" under the CFAA refers to expressive rather than
attitudinal factual consent. To authorize is to invest with authority;
this is an act, not an attitude.37 It is implausible to say that a computer
owner secretly "authorized" a use without telling anyone about it, not
even the user. Conversely, a CFAA prosecution based on the owner's
secret withdrawal of authorization would fail because the user did not
"intentionally" or "knowingly" use the computer without authoriza-
31 See id. at 14-15.
32 See Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2 Omo ST.
J. CRmI. L. 333, 334-35 (2004).
33 See WESTEN, supra note 4, at 27.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 27, 67.
37 See Authorize, BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("to give legal authority" or
"empower").
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tion.38 For this reason, I will refer simply to "factual" consent except
when the distinction between attitudinal factual consent and expres-
sive factual consent matters. Consider a simple example:
House Guest: A is staying with S. She tells him, "I'm going
to run some errands. Feel free to use my computer while I'm
gone." A uses S's computer to check his email.
Here, A is authorized because S's statement to A constitutes ex-
plicit factual consent. Compare:
Starbucks: S leaves her laptop computer open on a table at a
Starbucks while she gets up to use the restroom. A goes over
to the computer and starts browsing through S's emails.
Here, by contrast, A acts without authorization because he uses
S's computer without her factual consent. Starbucks shows that the
default is no authorization; unless a computer owner affirmatively ex-
presses consent to use, there is none. But consent need not be given
in so many words:
Weather Website: S connects a computer to the Internet and
creates a website that enables users to input a ZIP code and
then tells them whether to bring an umbrella with them. A
visits the site, inputs his ZIP code, and views the resulting
advice.
Here, as in Starbucks, S has not explicitly stated that A does or
does not have consent. But unlike in Starbucks, A does use S's com-
puter with her factual consent. The difference is that access takes
place online, and S has done something-created a website apparently
intended for public use-that manifests her factual consent.3 9 Creat-
ing a website is a communicative act that would be understood by
Internet users like A as implicitly inviting them to use the website.40
A reasonable person in A's position, knowing what A knows about
websites, would believe that S acquiesced in his use of her website.
Factual consent is not always this simple, but where it is simple, we
should acknowledge it as such. A more interesting case is:
United States v. Morris:41 S connects a computer to the In-
ternet and installs on it a program, SEND MAIL, that lets
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) ("intentionally"); id. § 1030(a)(4) ("knowingly").
39 Cf WESTEN, supra note 4, at 76-87 (discussing nonverbal expressive consent and com-
municative conduct in the context of the rape law).
40 Cf Christopher M. Newman, "What Exactly Are You Implying? ": The Elusive Nature of
the Implied Copyright License, 32 CARDOzo ARTS & Errr. L.J. 501, 518-21 (2014) (discussing
implied factual consent in the context of copyright licenses).
41 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
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other computers deliver emails to it.42 A writes a "worm"
program that connects to S's computer and transmits a se-
quence of commands that causes SEND MAIL to install and
run a copy of the worm program on S's computer. 43
It is superficially temping to say of a case like Morris that S's
computer "consented" to A's use by allowing him to install his worm
program.44 But this argument proves far too much. Any defendant
could always claim that the computer "consented" to his use: indeed,
the defendant in Starbucks could claim that the open laptop "con-
sented." 45  The issue is not whether the computer consented but
whether its owner did. That cannot be reduced to a purely technical
question of what the computer actually does. What the computer en-
ables a user to do is relevant to authorization only insofar as it informs
the user about the owner's consent.46 A had factual consent in
Weather Website not because the website itself consented, but because
the website was designed in a way that effectively communicated its
designer's consent.
The better approach to Morris, then, is to ask directly whether S
gave factual consent to the use A engaged in-using SEND MAIL to
install his worm program. The answer is almost certainly "no." To be
sure, A can argue that S connected a computer to the Internet that
runs a program the world is free to use, and thereby implicitly ex-
pressed consent to use of that program. But for the same reason that
A understood that he was permitted to use SEND MAIL to send mail,
he understood that he was not permitted to use it to install a worm;
the same interpretive conventions that communicate permission also
communicate the limits of the scope of that permission. The guest in
House Guest correctly interpreted the illocutionary force of S's ex-
42 See id at 505-06.
43 See id.
44 This is the type of argument memorably made by the defendant in the Australian case
of Kennison v. Daire, (1986) 160 CLR 129 (Austl.). A bank customer who knew that an ATM
would give him money even after he closed his account argued, unsuccessfully, that he had had
not committed larceny because the ATM "consented" to his taking the money. Id. at 129-30.
45 See Grimmelmann, Computer Crime Law Goes to the Casino, supra note 10 ("In every
interesting case, the defendant will have been able to make the program do something objection-
able. If a program conveys authorization whenever it lets a user do something, there would be
no such thing as 'exceeding authorized access.' Every use of a computer would be authorized.").
46 Of course, it is also relevant to the scope of "access" requiring authorization; a hacker
who tries but fails to withdraw money from a victim's online banking account is guilty only of
attempting to violate section (a)(4) of the CFAA, which prohibits "knowingly and with intent to
defraud . . . obtain[ing] anything of value" by means of unauthorized access. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(4).
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press acquiescence to mean that he could use her computer to check
email but not drop it out a tenth-story window. Internet users simi-
larly must interpret the illocutionary force of the implied acquiescence
conveyed by making a program available. They are in the same situa-
tion as Mitchum, who understood that he was permitted to take one
match but not the whole box, and Hands, who understood that he was
permitted to take a cigarette by depositing a penny but not by deposit-
ing a slug.47
The Second Circuit almost got this point right in Morris. It up-
held A's conviction on the theory that he "did not use [SEND MAIL]
in any way related to [its] intended function."48 On this reasoning, S's
"intent" about the "function" of a program defines the limit of her
acquiescence, and hence of her factual consent. 49 The problem is that
"intent" connotes S's subjective intent and thus suggests that A's guilt
turns on S's attitudinal consent-her secret undisclosed goals in mak-
ing SEND MAIL available. If, for example, she installed SEND
MAIL with the privately held intent of transmitting only upbeat
emails, A would, on this theory, act without authorization by sending
a depressing email. The Second Circuit should instead have made the
point in terms of expressive factual consent: e.g., that A "did not use
[SEND MAIL] in any way related to what a reasonable user would
have understood as its intended function." This intent, and thus the
consent it signifies, is objective in the same way that a manifestation of
assent to a contract is objective; it is what a hypothetical reasonable
listener would understand the speaker to be intending to convey.
Here, a hypothetical reasonable user would have understood that
47 Cf EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2003) (rejecting
"reasonable expectations" as test for authorization because a "website provider can easily spell
out explicitly what is forbidden"). This is a channeling rule; it gives computer owners an unam-
biguous way to limit consent and encourages them to use it by denying CFAA protection unless
they use it. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799,
801-03 (1941) (defining "channeling function" of formalities). Similar channeling rules are
found all throughout the law of consent. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge
in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2181 (1995) ("But permission must be an affirmative
indication of actual willingness. Silence and ambivalence are not permission."). They trade off
the accuracy of fact-finding about consent in specific cases in order to encourage more general
communicative practices that promote clearer understandings of when consent is present or ab-
sent. They function as "sticky default" and "information-forcing" rules. See Ian Ayres, Regulat-
ing Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2035, 2045 (2012).
Depending on whether the default is one of consent or nonconsent, they can encourage either
the subject whose consent is at issue or the actor who requires consent to press for greater
clarity.
48 Morris, 928 F.2d at 510.
49 See id.
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SEND MAIL is for sending mail, not for installing worms. When A
used SEND MAIL to install his worm, he failed to apply the appropri-
ate interpretive canons of the relevant community of computer
users.50 He either misunderstood or ignored SEND MAIL's meaning.
I want to emphasize that factual consent is a function of both
code and words; of how a computer is programmed and of its owner's
expressions, such as oral instructions, terms of service, and employee
handbooks.-" Both are relevant sources of evidence about the owner's
factual consent. First, consider a slight variation on Morris.52 (The
additional facts are underlined.)
Security Audit: S connects a computer to the Internet and
installs on it a program, SEND MAIL, that lets other com-
puters deliver emails to it. S instructs A to conduct a security
audit of the computer, including by attempting to install a
"worm" program. A writes a "worm" program that connects
to S's computer and transmits a sequence of commands that
causes SEND MAIL to install and run a copy of the worm
program on S's computer.
The only difference between Morris and Security Audit is S's ex-
plicit instructions, but they make all the difference; A obviously acts
with S's factual consent. This shows that authorization is not a purely
technical concept; it always potentially depends on the computer
owner's words. Indeed, precisely because they convey meaning ex-
plicitly rather than implicitly like software, words will often provide
the clearest indication of the uses to which the computer owner does
and does not factually consent.53 There is no reason to disregard such
probative evidence. 5 4
50 wESTEN, supra note 4, 71-75 (An actor's interpretive community consists of real or
hypothetical observers "who know (i) everything that the actor himself knows regarding S's
words and conduct, (ii) all social conventions for expressing desires, preferences, and choices of
which the actor himself is aware, and (iii) any further words or conduct on S's part, as well as any
further conventions for expressing desires, preferences, and choices, of which the actor would be
aware if he paid appropriate or 'reasonable' attention to the interests of others.").
51 Orin Kerr calls these "code-based restrictions" and "contract-based restrictions," re-
spectively. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 2, at 1600. The distinction is helpful, but the
terms can be misleading in two ways. First, contracts are not the only way to communicate
restrictions on computer use with words; a statement by a computer owner may be effective in
manifesting the limits of her expressive factual consent even if it is not binding as a contract.
And second, code and words can permit, not just restrict.
52 See Morris, 928 F.2d at 505-06.
53 See Grimmelmann, Computer Crime Law Goes to the Casino, supra note 10 ("Words
work for saying things; that's why we use them. In contrast, code is a terrible medium for com-
municating permission and prohibition.").
54 Orin Kerr appears to believe that these "contract-based" restrictions on computer use
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But code also matters, even when words are clear on their face.
Consider:
Wink Wink: S creates a website to discuss and trade model
cars. The terms of service, to which users must click "I
agree" when they create accounts, state that no one under
the age of eighteen is permitted to use the site. A, who is
fifteen, creates an account, and selects his true year of birth
from a drop-down menu as part of the signup process. So do
tens of thousands of other underage users over a period of
five years. S takes no action against them.
Here, S has factually consented to A's use of the site, but this
time code rather than words provides the manifestation of factual con-
sent. S is aware that A and other minors are using the site in violation
of the stated terms of service and has continued to allow them to do
so, even though she could straightforwardly have deleted their ac-
counts or prevented them from signing up if they selected too recent a
year of birth during the account creation process. She is like a restau-
rant patron who says "No tip for you!" while handing the waiter a $20
bill: her actions speak louder than her words. Any plausible theory of
authorization under the CFAA must therefore be willing to take both
code and words into account, or it will misunderstand cases like Secur-
ity Audit and Wink Wink.
III. LEGAL CONSENT
Now for legal consent: the conclusion a jurisdiction reaches when
it decides that it will regard S as having consented to x. Legal consent
is based on factual consent, but can depart from it in one of two ways.
On the one hand, a jurisdiction might say that factual consent is not
sufficient to constitute legal consent because there are good reasons to
treat S's genuine factual consent as defective.55 On the other hand, a
jurisdiction might say that factual consent is not necessary for legal
consent because there are good reasons to treat S as though she had
factually consented, even though she did not.56 Westen calls legal con-
are simply not relevant to the question of "authorization" under the CFAA. Kerr, Cybercrime's
Scope, supra note 2, at 1600; Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, supra note 3, at 1175; see Kerr,
Vagueness Challenges, supra note 3, at 1572. Skepticism towards such restrictions is a conse-
quence of conflating factual and legal consent. See infra Part IV. Given Kerr's normative view
of the CFAA's proper scope, he ought to admit terms of service and other such word-based
restrictions at the factual consent stage, but limit their role in drawing the contours of (prescrip-
tive and imputed) legal consent. See infra Part III.
55 See WESTEN, supra note 4, at 139-40.
56 Id. at 271.
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sent prescriptive consent when it is based on S's underlying factual
consent 57 and imputed consent when it is not.5 8
Start with prescriptive consent. The three traditional reasons for
treating factual consent as invalid are coercion, deception, and inca-
pacity. 59 To use examples from rape law, factual consent need not
provide legal consent when A threatens to kill S, when A lies about his
HIV status, or when S is twelve years old. The common theme is that
S's consent is not "true" consent because it was not the product of a
genuinely autonomous choice on her part.60 Of these three, I will fo-
cus on deception, which is pervasive in CFAA cases.
Factual consent is, as the name implies, commonly a question of
fact. S either does or does not express consent to x. 61 Conversely,
legal consent inevitably requires contestable policy choices. To say
that prescriptive legal consent is not present because factual consent
was procured by fraud requires saying which kinds of mistakes the
jurisdiction will regard as the product of culpable fraud.62 This is not a
purely factual question; it requires normative judgments about which
matters are serious enough to void consent and which are not. A ju-
risdiction could say that consent to trespass is not knowingly given if S
is mistaken about what day of the week it is; no jurisdiction does, be-
cause such deceptions are regarded as too trivial to worry about.6 3
In the cases above, prescriptive consent is simple. In House
Guest, Weather Website, and Security Audit, there is no reason on the
facts as given to look behind S's factual consent, so A also acts with
prescriptive legal consent. In Wink Wink, S's long-standing practice
of letting minors use the site is both knowing and freely chosen. And
in Starbucks and Morris, S never gave factual consent, so the question
of prescriptive consent does not even arise.
57 Id. at 139. It is "prescriptive" in the sense that the jurisdiction prescribes the conditions
it requires to treat factual consent as legally effective.
58 Id. at 271.
59 Id. at 179-91.
60 Id. at 191.
61 A jurisdiction might specify the interpretive rules to be used in analyzing S's putative
expressions of consent. Examples include a requirement of "affirmative" consent to sexual con-
duct or of written consent forms for consent to participate in experiments. When these rules
incorporate substantive policy views or channeling rules that aim to improve the quality of ex-
pressions of consent in general, rather than being directed to ascertaining a particular S's atti-
tude toward x, they are to that extent rules of legal consent, not just of factual consent.
62 See Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception and then of Common Law Categories, 85
TEX. L. REv. 1359, 1363 (2007).
63 See id. at 1362-74 (discussing fraud that does and does not vitiate consent, with exam-
ples drawn primarily from civil trespass).
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For a more interesting example from the CFAA, disloyal em-
ployee cases are naturally described in terms of the employee's con-
cealment of how she intends to use the data she acquires from
company computers. For example:
United States v. Nosal:64 S, an executive search firm, main-
tains a database on its internal corporate network containing
information about potential candidates. 65 A, an employee of
S, copies information from the database and gives it to one
of S's competitors. 66
Here, A uses the database with S's factual consent; indeed, S did
not merely acquiesce in A's use of the database but affirmatively in-
structed him to use it. But this is not to say that A had legal consent.
A deceived S about how he intended to use the information he sought
to obtain from the database. Whether this deception should be re-
garded as vitiating S's factual consent is a policy question, one that
requires a court to decide whether the CFAA's statutory goals would
be better served by holding A liable or not. Some courts regard A as
having acted with authorization, some without.6 7 Both views are plau-
sible; neither can be deduced from first principles.
Now for imputed legal consent, in which a jurisdiction regards S
as having given consent to x even when she has not (f)actually con-
sented. The most important species of imputed consent for CFAA
purposes is constructive consent, in which S is irrebuttably regarded as
having consented to conduct x by virtue of having consented to some
other conduct y. 6 8 Westen gives the hypothetical example of a "fastid-
ious fan" F who stands in the middle of a stadium exit at the end of a
game, shouting, "I do not consent to be touched!" as the crowd surges
past.69 Even if A could easily avoid making contact with F, she is
under no obligation to do so; she may pass by with the usual elbow
bumping associated with any densely packed crowd. F has consented
to harmless intentional batteries of this sort by virtue of consenting to
attend the game and leaving when everyone else does.
To understand constructive consent, it helps to contrast it with the
other two species of imputed legal consent-informed consent, in
64 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
65 See id. at 856.
66 See id.
67 Compare id. at 864 (finding no CFAA violation), with United States v. Rodriguez, 628
F.3d 1258, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding CFAA violation).
68 WESTEN, supra note 4, at 272-75.
69 Id. at 322-23.
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which S consents to a known risk of x, 70 and hypothetical consent, in
which the jurisdiction assumes that S would have consented to x had
she been able to.71 A football player is deemed to give informed con-
sent to the known risk of a broken spine from a hard hit-but this is
consent only to the risk of one, not consent for an opposing linebacker
to break his spine deliberately. An unconscious accident victim is
deemed to give hypothetical consent to an emergency blood transfu-
sion-but this is only a default rule, which a Jehovah's Witness can
override with advance instructions to the contrary on a medical brace-
let. In contrast, note that the fastidious fan's constructive consent sub-
jects him to intentional batteries and that he can withhold it only by
staying home in the first place.
Like prescriptive legal consent, imputed legal consent is invented
rather than discovered. It is a legal fiction, one that the courts enter-
tain because desirable social consequences flow from it. Informed and
hypothetical consent are implied as a matter of fact; they can be justi-
fied by looking to S's own interests.72 Informed consent promotes au-
tonomy by letting people make their own decisions about whether the
benefits of a package deal are worth the risks.73 Hypothetical consent
promotes wellbeing by giving people what most of them are likely to
want, while preserving autonomy for those who make clear they do
not want the same thing others do. 7 4 But constructive consent is im-
plied as a matter of law, because it necessarily has broader aims than
just S's. Getting out of the stadium at the end of sporting events
would be more frustrating for everyone if fans could carry legally en-
forceable personal space bubbles with them. Constructive consent
uses the fiction of consent because, as Westen explains, "[the subject]
chose to take advantage of the benefits of a social practice that, in the
state's judgment, could not justly exist and otherwise might not exist
in its present form without the concomitant burdens .... " This is
the same kind of justification Baron Bramwell gave in Holmes v.
Mather7 6 for rejecting strict liability in unintentional injury cases: "For
the convenience of mankind in carrying on the affairs of life, people as
70 Id. at 280-84.
71 Id. at 284-93.
72 See Westen, supra note 4, at 108, 122.
73 See id. at 108.
74 See id.
75 Id. at 278.
76 Holmes v. Mather, [1875] 10 LR Exch. 261 (Eng.).
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they go along roads must expect, or put up with, such mischief as rea-
sonable care on the part of others cannot avoid."77
Let us return to the CFAA. In Starbucks, there is no more reason
to impute S's legal consent to A's use of her computer merely because
she left it open on a table than there is to say that a person who leaves
her wallet lying around should be deemed to consent when someone
else walks off with it. No good, and much mischief, would follow from
such a rule. Likewise, no useful purpose would be served by letting
customers grab entire boxes of matches from shop counters or letting
petty hooligans walk off with whatever they can extract from a vend-
ing machine by hook or by crook. Similar considerations apply to
Morris; unleashing worms that crash the Internet is not something so-
ciety cares to encourage. For a case raising a more interesting issue of
imputed consent, consider:
Craigslist v. 3Taps:78 S runs a classified-ads website. 79 A peri-
odically uses a program to scrape information from S's web-
site about its listings.80 S sends A a cease-and-desist letter
stating that A is "no longer authorized to access . . . [S's]
website or services for any reason."81 A continues to scrape
information from S's website.82
Here, A scrapes S's website without factual consent. S has made
its nonacquiescence in A's use completely explicit. But just as above,
this is not the end of the matter. Even if A did not have S's factual
consent, there may be good reasons to impute S's constructive legal
consent. For example, one might argue that information on a website
is publicly accessible and that allowing website owners to selectively
exclude individual users would chill speech and innovation. Whether
those reasons are compelling or not is a policy question, one that
again requires a court to decide whether the CFAA's statutory goals
would be better served by holding A liable or not. Some courts regard
A as having acted with authorization, 83 some without.84 Both views
are plausible; neither can be deduced from first principles.85
77 Id. at 267.
78 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
79 See id. at 966.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 967.
82 See id.
83 E.g., Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932-33 (E.D. Va. 2010).
84 E.g., 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 969-70.
85 Cf Negro v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 221-25 (Cal Ct.
App. 2014) (holding that consent to disclosure of email under the Stored Communications Act
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If you are skeptical of the claims that the defendant in Nosal has
factual consent. and the defendant in 3 Taps does not, try taking the
online aspect of the cases out of the picture. Imagine that A is physi-
cally seated at a computer and that the CEO of S is standing beside
him. Immediately before he starts typing, A turns to S and asks, "May
I use this computer?" In the offline version of Nosal, the CEO would
say something like, "Yes, get started, you have dozens of calls to make
and I don't have all day!" That is expressive factual consent. True,
the CEO doesn't know that A is planning to turn around and betray S.
But the CEO acquiesces in the computer use itself, and A quite rightly
understands that she does.86 On the other hand, in the offline version
of 3Taps, the CEO would say something like, "No, of course not, I
already told you to stop!" That is expressive factual nonconsent. The
CEO does not express an attitude of acquiescence in the computer
use, and A quite rightly understands that she does not.
Note the relationship between prescriptive and imputed consent.
They are opposites: one applies to remove factual consent where it
exists, while the other applies to replace factual consent where it does
not exist.87 Only one is in play in any given case, but one or the other
is always in play. The consequence is that whether S gives factual con-
sent or not, there is always a live legal question of whether a court
should treat A as acting with S's consent. If factual consent is present,
there is a normative question whether to regard it as prescriptively
valid. If factual consent is absent, there is a normative question
whether to impute it. Either way, legal consent is a normative
question.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Factual and legal consent are distinct. But both are indispensable
concepts: trying to do without one or the other leads to confusion. So
does conflating them.
"is not satisfied by consent that is merely constructive, implied in law, or otherwise imputed to
the user by a court").
86 Even if the CEO explicitly purports to make his consent conditional on A's loyalty, it is
still factual consent because S's agent manifests acquiescence to A's access at the moment of
access. The purported condition goes instead to the question of prescriptive consent. By show-
ing that the CEO regarded A's loyalty as a necessary precondition of consenting to A's access, it
provides a reason, though not necessarily a conclusive one, to deny that A has legal consent. Cf
WESTEN, supra note 4, at 199-201 (criticizing theories under which consent "is not a valid de-
fense if [S] is mistaken about anything that causes her to acquiesce when she would otherwise
not do so").
87 See id. at 108-09.
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The inevitability of asking about legal consent does not mean that
factual consent is irrelevant, because legal consent incorporates fac-
tual consent. Some conditions of legal consent can be rewritten with-
out reference to S's consent, some cannot.88 For example, a
jurisdiction could define statutory rape either by defining minors to be
categorically incapable of giving (prescriptive legal) consent or by
making it is a crime to have sexual intercourse with a minor.89 These
are equivalent definitions; one uses a fiction of nonconsent and the
other does not, but they punish identical conduct. Rape as a whole
cannot be so redefined, because factual consent helps define the con-
tours of the conduct to be punished; rape defined in terms of force is a
different crime that punishes different conduct than rape defined in
terms of nonconsent."0
But just as factual consent is indispensable, so is legal consent.
Being clear about factual consent helps isolate the purely normative
questions of legal consent. Starbucks, House Guest, and Weather
Website are easy cases and there is no reason to complicate them.
Morris, Nosal, and 3Taps are harder cases, because they involve ambi-
guities about factual, prescriptive, and imputed consent, respectively.
Although disloyal employee cases like Nosal and web scraping
cases like 3Taps are similar in that both involve access that is allegedly
rendered unauthorized by words rather than by code, they need not
be treated alike. Disloyal employee cases are prescriptive consent
cases, and the crucial question is whether the employee's fraud on the
employer is so fundamental that it should be regarded as making the
computer use itself wrongful. This is an issue that ought to be re-
solved in light of the policies of employment law, including employ-
ees' duty of loyalty, trade secret duties of confidentiality, employee
mobility, freedom of contract, and collective bargaining. But web
scraping cases are imputed consent cases, and the crucial question
here is whether to give website owners the power to selectively ex-
clude specific users or classes of uses. Other bodies of law, including
common law trespass to chattels, copyright, and contract law, also pur-
port to (sometimes) limit such access, and the CFAA should not give
dramatically different answers than they do.91
Recognizing that legal consent is created and not discovered also
directs attention toward the kinds of doctrinal distinctions courts are
88 See id. at 114-19.
89 Id. at 116-17.
90 Id. at 116-19.
91 Fortunately, related concepts of consent are also at work in these other areas.
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free to make. This is where the fictions of consent can do genuinely
useful work. Take scraping. Online trespass to chattels has come to
rest on the doctrine that "an electronic communication that neither
damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning" is
not actionable. 2 This rule is phrased in terms of the results of A's
conduct, but it could just as easily be phrased in terms of S's imputed
consent. A reasonable computer owner who makes a website gener-
ally available could be regarded as having consented to harmless
scraping, but not to scraping that causes loss of data or causes the
computer to crash, just as the fastidious fan consents to being bumped
up against but not to being slugged in the jaw. Such a distinction is
almost impossible to derive through haruspicy on the entrails of the
CFAA's tortured legislative history, but it is straightforward on a the-
ory of authorization as consent.
Although factual consent and legal consent are distinct concepts,
most academic and judicial discussion of the CFAA collapses the two.
Orin Kerr's decade of work on the CFAA illustrates some of the re-
sulting difficulties. 93 Consider his recent social norms theory of au-
thorization under the CFAA: that "concepts of authorization rest
on . . . broadly shared attitudes about what conduct amounts to an
uninvited entry into another person's private space." 94
In some places, Kerr describes social norms of offline trespass
and computer misuses in ways that are appropriate when speaking of
factual consent:
The trespass norm governing a commercial store might be
that entrance is permitted when a ready means of access is
available that can be read in context as an open invitation.
That principle limits on which means of access are allowed.
An open window isn't an invitation to jump through the win-
dow and go inside. If there's an open chimney or mail drop,
that's not an invitation to try to enter the store.95
This is a descriptive argument about what forms of entry a store
owner factually consents to. Social norms help prospective visitors in-
terpret the scope of the owner's consent. Kerr adds that owners can
override this default against entering through the chimney by granting
"explicit permission" to do so." Authorization under the CFAA is the
92 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
93 See supra notes 2-3.
94 Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, supra note 3, at 1146
95 Id. at 1152.
96 Id.
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same, Kerr argues; online or off, authorization is defined by "social
signals of what entry is permitted or forbidden."97
But in other places Kerr describes social norms in ways that are
appropriate when speaking of legal consent: "A computer owner can-
not both publish data to the world and yet keep specific users out just
by expressing that intent. It is something like publishing a newspaper
but then forbidding someone to read it. Publishing on the Web means
publishing to all . . . ."98
This is a normative argument about the proper scope of (im-
puted) legal consent: Kerr's "open norm of the World Wide Web" im-
putes consent to a specific user's access from the fact that the owner
lets the public at large engage in the same form of access. 99 It is a
rough online equivalent to a doctrine requiring nondiscrimination in
public accommodations.
The problem is that there are cases where Kerr's descriptive and
normative claims cut in opposite directions. Take 3Taps, where the
computer owner generally allowed access to a website but specifically
forbade the defendant from using it. On the one hand, "[1]ife experi-
ence with common social practices creates shared understandings"
that if someone tells you not to visit a website, you lack their permis-
sion to visit it.'oo On the other, "[p]ublishing on the Web means pub-
lishing to all."10 ' Kerr seems to be arguing both that the owner
consented to access and that it did not.
The paradox resolves itself when we recognize that Kerr is shift-
ing between factual and legal consent. The first part of his article
shows why the computer owner did not give factual consent in 3Taps;
the second part is a sustained argument that we should nonetheless
impute legal consent. I previously thought that there was a contradic-
tion between the two, but I was wrong. The two halves of his argu-
ment focus on different senses of consent.
Unfortunately, Kerr's equivocation between factual and legal
consent undermines his appeal to social norms. If social norms are
used descriptively, to inform computer users and courts about the
scope of factual consent (as in Weather Website and Kerr's chimney
example), they are incapable of resolving hard policy questions about
the proper scope of the CFAA. But if social norms are used norma-
97 Id. at 1153.
98 Id. at 1169.
99 Id. at 1147.
100 Id. at 1150.
101 Id. at 1169.
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tively, to tell courts when they ought to find legal consent (as in Nosal
and 3Taps), their use is highly problematic for precisely the reason
Kerr himself pinpointed in a different paper: the contestability of on-
line norms creates a substantial vagueness problem.102 Kerr himself
ducks the question by claiming that courts "cannot merely identify
existing norms" but instead "must identify the best rules to apply." 103
This argument is not really an appeal to social norms at all; it merely
restates the interpretive task facing judges but calls the resulting doc-
trines "norms."
Distinguishing the two kinds of consent at work allows for a
weaker but more defensible version of Kerr's argument. On the one
hand, the use of norms of computer use to understand factual consent
is unproblematic; indeed, a social account of implicit meaning is nec-
essary to any sensible account of expressive factual consent. 104 On the
other, the most that norms of computer use can do for legal consent is
to give force to policy arguments. The fact that there is a widely
shared norm about a particular practice can tell courts that the prac-
tice is socially beneficial and that a decision allowing that practice will
be accepted by computer users. But these are not conclusive: there is
a widespread norm of driving faster than posted speed limits, and yet
courts still enforce speeding laws, as they should.
CONCLUSION
I have been writing about the interpretation of a computer
owner's expressions of consent, but statutes also require interpreta-
tion. "Authorization" under the CFAA is best understood as incorpo-
rating the traditional legal understanding of consent, as seen, for
example, in the criminal law of trespass, theft, battery, and rape. In all
of these areas, "consent" is a complex bundle of doctrines, built
around factual consent but incorporating a variety of legal fictions.
And they are different bundles: the same expression can manifest suf-
ficient consent for one but not another. Computer misuse law will
need its own bundle-one whose details derive not only or even pri-
marily from congressional intent as expressed in the text of the CFAA
102 See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 3.
103 Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, supra note 3, at 1147.
104 Grimmelmann, Computer Crime Law Goes to the Casino, supra note 10. "Norms" may
not be the best term to describe these social facts. It might be better to speak of shared "conven-
tions" or "expectations" about the scope of permitted use. But this is a minor point; Kerr's
underlying intuition is sound.
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but instead from extended judicial engagement with the facts of com-
puter use.
Put another way, "authorization" in the CFAA requires construc-
tion rather than interpretation.105 The linguistic meaning of "authori-
zation" is almost completely exhausted by the observation that
authorization incorporates the familiar legal concept of consent.
Courts must instead construe the term by developing rules that cap-
ture the idea of a computer owner's consent effectively in light of the
overall goals of the CFAA and the facts of specific cases. By using
this term Congress has-dare I say it?-authorized courts to do so.
105 Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
95, 100-08 (2010).
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